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Abstract
This paper motivates the use of computational argumentation
for evaluating ‘concept blends’ and other forms of combina-
torial creativity. We exemplify our approach in the domain of
computer icon design, where icons are understood as creative
artefacts generated through concept blending. We present a
semiotic system for representing icons, showing how they
can be described in terms of interpretations and how they
are related by sign patterns. The interpretation of a sign pat-
tern conveys an intended meaning for an icon. This intended
meaning is subjective, and depends on the way concept blend-
ing for creating the icon is realised. We show how the in-
tended meaning of icons can be discussed in an explicit and
social argumentation process modeled as a dialogue game,
and show examples of these following the style of Lakatos
(1976). In this way, we are able to evaluate concept blends
through an open-ended and dynamic discussion in which con-
cept blends can be improved and the reasons behind a specific
evaluation are made explicit. In a closing discussion, we talk
how argumentation can play a role at different stages of the
concept blending process.
Introduction
A proposal by (Fauconnier and Turner, 1998) called concept
blending has reinvigorated studies trying to unravel the gen-
eral cognitive principles operating during creative thought.
According to (Fauconnier and Turner, 1998), concept blend-
ing is a cognitive process that serves a variety of cognitive
purposes, including creativity. In this way of thinking, hu-
man creativity can be modeled as a blending process that
takes different mental spaces as input and blends them into
a new mental space called a blend. This is a form of combi-
natorial creativity, one of the three forms of creativity iden-
tified by Boden (2003). A blend is constructed by taking
the existing commonalities among the input mental spaces –
known as the generic space – into account, and by project-
ing the structure of the input spaces in a selective way. In
general the outcome can have an emergent structure arising
from a non-trivial combination of the projected parts. Differ-
ent projections lead to different blends and different generic
spaces constrain the possible projections.
This poses challenges from a computational perspective:
large number of possible combinations exhibiting vastly dif-
ferent properties can be constructed by choosing different
input spaces, using different ways to compute the generic
space, and selecting projections. Within the Concept Inven-
tion Theory project1 (COINVENT), we are currently devel-
oping a computational account of concept blending based on
insights from psychology, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and
cognitive modelling (Schorlemmer et al., 2014). One of our
goals is to address this combinatorial nature. One potential
outcome of this work is a deeper understanding of the way
combinatorial creativity works in general.
The formal and computational model for concept blend-
ing under development in COINVENT (Bou et al., 2014) is
closely related to the notion of an amalgam (Ontan˜o´n and
Plaza, 2010). Amalgamation has its root in case-based rea-
soning and focuses on the problem of combining solutions
coming from multiple cases. Assuming the solution space
can be characterised as a generalisation space, the amal-
gam operation combines input solutions into a new solution
that contains as much information from the two inputs solu-
tions as possible. When input solutions cannot be combined,
amalgamation generalises them by omitting some of their
specifics. This process of generalisation and combination
is expensive from a computational point of view, because
many alternatives have to be explored.
The amalgam-based approach for computing blends
makes explicit the combinatorial nature of concept blending,
which raises the issue of evaluating and selecting novel and
valuable blends as opposed to those combinations that lack
interest or significance. Although Fauconnier and Turner
(1998) suggest a number of qualitative criteria that can be
used for evaluating concept blends, it is difficult to charar-
acterise them from a computational point of view.
In this paper, we propose to explore a discursive approach
to understanding and evaluating the meaning, interest, and
significance of concept blends. Specifically, we propose to
view evaluating blends as a process of argumentation, in
which the specifics of a blend are pinpointed and opened up
as issues of discussion. Our intuition is that in the context of
new ideas, proposals, or artworks, people use critical discus-
sion and argumentation to understand, absorb and evaluate.
We also consider the constructive roles that argumentation
can play in concept blending.
Computational argumentation models have recently ap-
peared in AI applications (Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2007;
1See http://www.coinvent-project.eu for details.
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Figure 1: An amalgam diagram with inputs I1 and I2 and
blend B obtained by combining I¯1 and I¯2. The arrows indi-
cate generalisation.
Rahwan and Simari, 2009), and we believe that incorpo-
rating argumentation can foster the development of a fuller
computational account of combinatorial creativity. The cur-
rent paper develops these themes at the level of (meta-)
design; implementation is saved for future work.
Roles of Argumentation in Concept Blending
Consider the amalgam diagram modeling the concept blend-
ing process (Figure 1): two input spaces I1, I2, two of their
possible generalisations I¯1, I¯2, which have a generic space
G and blend B. When two input spaces cannot be combined
because they do not satisfy certain criteria, the inputs have
to be generalised for omitting some of their specifics. The
combination of each specific pair I¯1, I¯2 yields a blend.
Informally, we can imagine argumentation taking place
at various points in the amalgam diagram. In general this
would happen in response to indeterminacy, that is, when
some features of the diagram are underdetermined. We fore-
see that argumentation can be used:
a. to express opinions or points of view that can be used for
guiding the selection/omission of specific parts of the in-
put spaces; in particular, to select a specific pair of gener-
alisation I¯1, I¯2 of the input spaces in the blending process;
b. to provide a computational setting for modeling discus-
sions around the quality of a creative artefact, with the
aim of evaluating and refining the generated blends.
In the first case, arguments would be about generalisation,
i.e. which features should be preserved from I1 and which
features should be preserved from I2. More complex infer-
ences could be involved, for example in a case where I1 is
fixed, and constraints and various optimality criteria on the
blend are imposed, which then yield various constraints on
what the other input I2 should be. We return to this point in
the discussion section, and we focus for the most part on the
second case.
In the second case, argumentation would be used to eval-
uate a range of blends, and the evaluation is carried out post
hoc, by a variation of try-it-and-see. A range of blends are
trialled, each one bringing out different (un)intended mean-
ings. The evaluation is modeled as an argument, or dialogue
in which the specifics of a blend are pinpointed and opened
up as issues of discussion. This dialogue can be considered
as an introspective evaluation, although it usually takes place
among several parties as a means for the social development
and understanding of creative artefacts. In this paper, we
focus on this role.
Our Approach
To exemplify our approach, we take the domain of computer
icons into account. We assume that concept blending is the
implicit process which governs the creative behavior of icon
designers who create new icons by blending existing icons
and signs. To this end, we propose a simple semiotic sys-
tem for modeling computer icons. We consider computer
icons as combinations of signs (e.g. document, magnifying
glass, arrow etc.) that are described in terms of interpre-
tations. Interpretations convey actions-in-the-world or con-
cepts and are associated with shapes. Signs are related by
sign-patterns modeled as qualitative spatial relations such
as above, behind, etc. Since sign-patterns are used to com-
bine signs, and each sign can have multiple interpretations,
a sign-pattern used to generate a computer icon can convey
multiple intended meanings to the icon. These are subjec-
tive interpretations of designers when they have to decide
what is the best interpretation an icon can have in the real
world. In this paper, we show how the intended meaning of
new designed (blended) icons can be evaluated and refined
by means of Lakatosian reasoning.
Background
Computational Argumentation
Computational argumentation in AI aims at modeling the
constitutive elements of argumentation, that are i) argu-
ments, ii) attack relations modeling conflicts, and iii) ac-
ceptibility semantics for selecting valid arguments (Bench-
Capon and Dunne, 2007; Rahwan and Simari, 2009).
The most well-known computational argumentation
framework is due to Dung (1995). Dung defines an abstract
framework to represent arguments and binary attack rela-
tions, modeling conflicts, by means of a graph. He defines
different acceptibility semantics to decide which arguments
are valid and, consequently, how conflicts can be resolved
(Figure 2).
a1 a2 a3
Figure 2: Dung framework example: Nodes represent argu-
ments and edges (binary) attack relations. Argument a1 is
attacked by a2 which is attacked by a3. Thus, a2 is defeated
and a1 can be accepted. a3 is also accepted.
Abstract argumentation frameworks do not deal with how
arguments are generated and exchanged. They merely fo-
cus on attack relations between arguments and acceptibility
semantics. However, the intrinsic dialectical nature of argu-
mentation is fully explored when an explicit argumentation
process is considered. Then, the purpose of a dialogue be-
comes essential to determine how arguments should be gen-
erated and exchanged, and how a dialogue should be struc-
tured (Walton and Krabbe, 1995).
Lakatosian argument and dialogue
Lakatos (1976) was a philosopher of mathematics who de-
veloped a model of argument, presented as a dialogue, to
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Figure 3: Our interpretation of Lakatos’s game patterns
describe ways in which mathematicians explore and develop
new areas of mathematics. In particular, he looked at the
role that conflict plays in such explorations, presenting a ra-
tional reconstruction of a dialogue in which claims are made
and counterexamples are presented and responded to in var-
ious different ways. His resulting model describes concep-
tual continuity and change in the growth of knowledge, and
contains dialogue moves, or methods, which suggest ways
in which concepts, conjectures and proofs are fluid and open
to negotiation, and gradually evolve via an organic process
of interaction and argument between mathematicians. These
dialogue moves are:
Surrender consists of abandoning a conjecture in the light
of a counter-example.
Piecemeal exclusion is an exception-barring method that
deals with exceptions by excluding a whole class of coun-
terexamples. This is done by generalising from a coun-
terexample to a class of counterexamples which have cer-
tain properties.
Strategic withdrawal is an exception-barring method that
uses positive examples of a conjecture and generalises
from these to a class of object, and then limits the domain
of the conjecture to this class.
Monster-barring/monster-adjusting is a way of exclud-
ing an unwanted counterexample. This method starts with
the argument that a ‘counterexample’ can be ignored be-
cause it is not a counterexample, as it is not within the
claimed concept definition. Rather, the object is seen as a
monster which should not be allowed to disrupt a harmo-
nious conjecture. Using this method, the original conjec-
ture is unchanged, but the meaning of the terms in it may
change. Monster-adjusting is similar, in that one reinter-
prets an object in such a way that it is no longer a coun-
terexample, although in this case the object is still seen as
belonging to the domain of the conjecture.
The moves above are not independent processes; much of
Lakatos’s work stressed the interdependence of creation and
justification. These moves describe the evolution of both ar-
guments and conclusions in mathematics, and as such con-
stitute argument patterns, or schemes. However, they are
a rational representation of exchanges between mathemati-
cians and describe dynamic, rather than static arguments,
presented as a dialogue. Thus, they also have temporal struc-
ture, and can be seen as a dialogue game, in which at any
point various dialogue moves are applicable (see (Pease et
al., 2014) for a description of Lakatos’s methods in these
terms). The fact that we include negotiations over definitions
and changes in the conclusions being argued means that it is
difficult to apply traditional abstract argumentation frame-
works, which assume that such aspects are stable. However,
we can see some of the moves in terms of Dung’s Abstract
Argumentation Framework: for instance if an initial argu-
ment for a conjecture forms a1 in Figure 2, then a2 might
be a counterexample to the conjecture, and a3 might be the
monster-barring move.
The Lakatosian way of conceiving the reasoning as an
open-ended discussion about a problem suggests that we can
exploit Lakatos’s moves for structuring dialogues for the
evaluation of creative artefacts. Evaluation in creativity is
not a static and rigid process, and the discussion should flow
in a dynamic way. As such, in this paper, we propose to use
Lakatosian reasoning to model the negotiation about the in-
tended meaning of generated blends (icons). Figure 3 shows
the dialogue game we will adopt to model these dialogues.
Icons and Signs
We follow a semiotic approach to specify the intended mean-
ing of computer icons. Semiotics is a transdisciplinary ap-
proach that studies meaning-making with signs and symbols
(Chandler, 2004). Although it is clearly related to linguis-
tics, semiotics also studies other forms of non-linguistic sign
systems and how they may convey meaning; this includes
not only designation, but also analogy, and metaphor. Al-
though some people may regard Peirce’s Sign Theory as the
origin of semiotics, Saussure founded his semiotics (semi-
ology) in the social sciences. Currently, cognitive semiotics
and computational semiotics take their own perspectives on
the relation between sign and meaning-making. In this pa-
per, we take a semiotic approach to describe computer icons
in the sense that icons, as a spatial pattern of shapes, are
viewed as signs, and compositions of signs are interpreted
to convey a meaning, as when we say ‘this icon means the
download is still active’.
The shapes recurrently used in icons are interpreted as
signs; screens, magnifying glasses and folders are examples
of signs. A magnifying glass sign can be used in different
icons in such a way that its meaning is context-dependent,
that is, it depends on other signs related to it in different
icons. We associate to each sign a set of interpretations, that
encode the kinds of intended meaning associated to that sign
as actions-in-the-world or concepts.
An icon is represented as a pattern defined by a collection
of signs and qualitative spatial relations like Above, Behind,
etc. We can find patterns of meaning that are shared among
different icons by analysing recurrent patterns of signs and
their spatial relation. We call them sign patterns. A sign
pattern has an associated collection of interpretations that
encode the intended meanings associated to that sign pattern.
Signs, sign patterns, and interpretations, which we will
use in the paper, can be built by analysing and annotating
existing libraries of computer icons. As we shall see, the in-
herent polysemy of signs, sign patterns and icons opens the
way to use arguments for evaluating the quality or adequacy
of new icons created by concept blending.
Shapes
Sign ID
Intepretations
Document
{info-container, document, text, page, file}
SIGN
(I) The structure of the DOCUMENT sign, including as-
sociated shapes and interpretations.
Shapes
Sign ID
Intepretations
MagnifyingGlass
{examine, analyse, preview, search, find-in}
SIGN
(II) The structure of the MAGNIFYINGGLASS sign, in-
cluding associated shapes and interpretations.
Figure 4: Example of signs
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Up
Down
Arrow
X
(I) (a) the sign pattern FROM-DOWNARROW with three examples of
the pattern where X is a sign for (b) cloud content, (c) document con-
tent, and (d) audio content.
(a) (b) (c)
Down
Arrow
X
Up
(II) (a) the sign pattern DOWNARROW-TOWARD with
two examples of the pattern where X is a sign for (b) a
hard disk storage, and (c) an optical disk storage.
Figure 5: Example of different sign patterns used with the same sign DOWNARROW
A Semiotic System for Icons
In this section, we will formalize the notions presented
above. A sign S is a tuple 〈id,F ,A〉where id is a sign iden-
tifier, F is a set of shapes embodying the sign S and A is a
set of interpretations. We use S to denote the available set
of signs. Figure 4 provides two examples. Figure 4I shows
the structure of the DOCUMENT sign, with several shapes
embodying the sign, and a list of interpretations that express
how this sign is used in different ways to convey meanings
such as info-container, document, text, page, file. Intuitively,
this means that the shapes used in the icons are sometimes
interpreted as a document and other times as a page, etc.
Moreover, the specific shapes can be used interchangeably to
embody a DOCUMENT, i.e. there is no clear distinction, re-
garding the shapes, between document vs. page vs. file. An-
other example of a sign is the MAGNIFYINGGLASS shown
in Figure 4II, with interpretations examine, analyse, preview,
search, and find-in.
We will also describe a library of annotated icons I,
where each icon I ∈ I consists of two parts: (1) a spatial
configuration of signs and (2) the intended meaning of that
icon. For instance, in Figure 5I, the icon (b) has the spatial
configuration of a ‘cloud on top of a downward-arrow’ and
its meaning is ‘downloading content from the cloud’.
Sign Patterns
In our framework, sign patterns relate signs in icons using
spatial qualitative relationships such as Above, Behind, Up,
Down, Left, etc. We assume that these relationships are rep-
resented as binary predicates, Above(X,Y), Up(X,Y), etc.,
where X and Y are variables ranging over signs in S. For
our current purposes, we use the qualitative spatial relation-
ships defined in (Falomir et al., 2012).
Let us consider two examples of sign patterns that in-
clude the DOWNARROW sign. DOWNARROW has a vertical
downward-pointing arrow shape and is associated with the
interpretations {down, downward, downloading, download-
from and download-to}. The sign pattern called FROM-
DOWNARROW (shown in the schema labelled (a) in Fig-
ure 5I) uses the qualitative spatial relationship Up between
a variable X and the sign DOWNARROW. Examples (b),
(c) and (d) in Figure 5I illustrate the intuitive meaning of
the sign pattern FROM-DOWNARROW: ‘downloading X’.
Thus, example (b) refers to downloading cloud content, (c)
document content, and (d) audio content.
The inherent asymmetry of arrows in general, and arrow
signs particularly, can be appreciated when considering the
opposite spatial relation, when the sign DOWNARROW is
“up” from another sign (Figure 5II). Then, the sign pattern
DOWNARROW-TOWARD is used to mean that X is the des-
tination of the downloading. Example icons (b) and (c) are
intended to mean that the data being downloaded (whose
type or origin is now elided) is to be stored in a destination
such as a hard disk or an optical disk.
Evaluating blends using argumentation
As briefly described previously, the amalgam-based compu-
tation of concept blending amounts to combine different in-
put spaces into a new space, called blend, by taking the com-
monalities of the inputs into account, by generalising some
of their specifics and by projecting other elements. In the
following, we describe how concept blending can account
for modeling the creative process of a designer of computer
icons.
Above(MagnifyingGlass,HardDisk)
Above(MagnifyingGlass,Y)
Generalisation
Combination
Above(MagnifyingGlass,Document)
Preview Page
Interpretation:   Search-HardDiskContent
Interpretation :   Preview-Page
Blend
Input 1
Above(Pen,Document)
Interpretation:   Edit-Document
Input 2
Above(X,Document)
Above(X,Y)
Generalisation
Generic Space
Figure 6: Generating an icon interpreted as Preview-Page
through amalgam-based concept blending.
A design scenario
Assume a designer is looking for creating a new icon with
the intended meaning of previewing a document or a page.
The creation of such icon can be achieved by the following
amalgam-based concept blending process (Figure 6). In ad-
dition to the DOCUMENT and MAGNIFYINGGLASS signs,
we assume we have available a HARDDISK sign and a PEN
sign which have already been used to make icons.
The input mental spaces. The input mental spaces
of the designer are an icon of a hard-disk with a mag-
nifying glass hovering above it, whose meaning is
Search-HardDiskContent, and an icon of a document
with a pen above it, whose meaning is Edit-Document.
The generic space. The sign pattern Above(X,Y)
is used in both icons. The first icon contains
the relation Above(MAGNIFYINGGLASS, HARDDISK)
between the MAGNIFYINGGLASS and the HARD-
DISK, and the second contains the relation Above
(PEN,DOCUMENT) between the PEN and the DOCU-
MENT.
Further generalisation. Two generalization steps
are needed: Above(MAGNIFYINGGLASS,HARDDISK)
→ Above(MAGNIFYINGGLASS,Y); correspondingly,
Above(PEN,DOCUMENT) → Above(X,DOCUMENT).
Combination via variable substitution. We com-
bine the schemas Above(MAGNIFYINGGLASS, Y) and
Above(X, DOCUMENT) via [X/MAGNIFYINGGLASS,
Y/DOCUMENT]. The icon of a page with a magnifying
glass hovering above it is generated.
The intended meaning. The designer associates to
the icon the intended meaning of Preview-Page, by
selecting the interpretations (Preview, Page) for the
MAGNIFYINGGLASS and DOCUMENT signs.
In this case, the designer decided that the intended
meaning of Above(MAGNIFYINGGLASS, DOCUMENT) is
Preview-Page, that is, a page can be examined without open-
ing it. However, during the creative process, the designer
could have generated other blends, not only by combin-
ing other signs, but also by selecting different interpreta-
tions associated to the MAGNIFYINGGLASS and DOCU-
MENT signs. For instance, the icon in Figure 7 still repre-
sents a page with a magnifying glass hovering above it, but
it has been given a different intended meaning.
Find-in-Page Magnifying 
Glass Document
Object Level
Above
Interpretation LevelFind-in Page
Figure 7: An example of interpreting the sign pattern of an
icon as Find-in-Page.
The meaning of a blended icon cannot simply be considered
right or wrong: interpretation depends on different points of
view. Thus the evaluation of whether it is useful or valid for
a specific purpose can be the object of a discussion.
Arguments about intended meanings
In the icon domain, arguments may include a clear interpre-
tation of any constituent signs in the icon if it is a composi-
tion of signs, or a good fit with other icons in the icon set.
For example, we can consider a counter-argument, i.e. an
argument that attacks the interpretation a1 “magnifying
glass above document means Preview-Page” in Figure 6, to
be phrased as follows:
a2 : “However, the icon in Figure 6 can also be inter-
preted to mean Find-in-Page.”
The rationale is that the MAGNIFYINGGLASS sign can often
be understood as finding or searching for something. Thus,
the icon can be also interpreted as Find-in-Page by associat-
ing the interpretation find-in instead of preview for the same
sign MAGNIFYINGGLASS (Figure 7).
This attacking argument can be made at an ab-
stract/conceptual level, for instance, by taking other possible
blends of the DOCUMENT and MAGNIFYINGGLASS signs
related by the sign pattern Above(X,Y) into account. Or, al-
ternatively, if there is an icon library that contains an icon
that ‘satisfies’ the argument above, then this attacking argu-
ment can be supported by a specific counterexample. Any
of these two forms of attack evaluates negatively the icon in
Figure 6. Therefore, if there are several alternative designs
for a new icon, this attacking argument diminishes the de-
gree of optimality/adequacy of that design with respect to
alternative designs.
The original interpretation can be defended, as usually
done in computational argumentation models, by a new ar-
gument that attacks the attacking argument a2. For instance,
the designer may say:
a3 : “The icon in Figure 6 can only be interpreted dif-
ferently if MAGNIFYINGGLASS is understood to mean
find-in instead of preview. However, the other icons in
my library use MAGNIFYINGGLASS to mean preview,
not find-in.”
Argumentation semantics can then be used, once a network
of arguments is built, to determine the outcome. For instance
whether argument a1, the original interpretation, is defeated
or not can be determined as follows (Figure 2): in this ex-
ample a3 has no attack, so it is undefeated, which means
it defeats a2; since a2 is defeated, the attack against a1 is
invalid and a1 is undefeated (i.e. is accepted).
Arguments about the intended meanings of an icon can
be embedded in a dialogue modeled in terms of Lakatos’s
moves and the dialogue pattern shown in Figure 3.
Lakatosian reasoning for blend evaluation
Here we present a Lakatos-style dialogue between two play-
ers, a proponent P and an opponent O. The goal of each
player is to persuade the other player of a point of view, in
this paper, the intended meaning of a new blended icon. In
such a setting, we expect to see negotiations over the mean-
ing of an icon take place between experts and novices, or
between people designing icons and people using (interpret-
ing) them, or various combinations.
To discuss a given icon using Lakatosian reasoning, we
assume that an initial conjecture is about the interpretation
of an icon usually being an action-in-the-world or a concept,
together with an example of a particular icon and a partic-
ular interpretation. The conjecture could be constructed by
inductive generalisation.
Example 1. In this example, Lakatosian reasoning is used
for discussing the intended meaning of a new icon generated
by concept blending:
P1: “An icon with a magnifying glass over a page means
Preview-Page” (Conjecture)
O1: “I disagree, this icon (Figure 7) means Find-in-page.”
(Counterexample)
P2: “No, this is a different case because the magnifying
glass must be over pages with text on them to magnify (it
shows what we’re about to magnify).” (Monster-barring)
After this dialogue, it is agreed that the intended meaning of
the icon is Preview-Page and the icon itself has been clar-
ified. Alternatively, the proponent and the opponent could
make a different evaluation by following different moves.
For instance, if the proponent accepts the counterexample,
then the intended meaning of the icon can be refined due to
piecemeal exclusion:
P1: “An icon with a magnifying glass over a page mean
Preview-Page” (Conjecture)
O1: “I disagree, this icon (Figure 7) means Find-in-page.”
(Counterexample)
P3: “Ok, only icons with a magnifying glass over a page
with text mean Preview-Page”. (Piecemeal exclusion)
After this dialogue the intended meaning about the new icon
has been changed by modifying the conjecture and taking
the counterexample into account.
Sometimes players have different points of view due to
the sign patterns they have used in their concept blending.
(I) Composite cloud icon (II) Stateful component (III) Processing component
Figure 8: Interpreting the design of cloud icons2
Example 2. Let us imagine that the proponent has gen-
erated an intended meaning for an icon using the FROM-
DOWNARROW sign pattern, whereas the opponent has used
the DOWNARROW-TOWARD pattern (Figure 5 illustrates
these cases). The two players can engage in the following
dialogue:
P1: “Look at icons in Figure 5I, icons with a DOWNARROW
relate to content.” (Initial Conjecture)
O1: “The icon in Figure 5IIb has a DOWNARROW but
doesn’t relate to content.” (Counterexample)
O2: “The icon in Figure 5IIc also has a DOWNARROW but
doesn’t relate to content.” (Counterexample)
P2: “The conjecture is right because the two examples ac-
tually do relate to content as they are to do with storage
and content is part of storage.” (Monster-adjusting)
In this case, the proponent excludes the counterexamples us-
ing monster-adjusting, and reinterpreting them in a way that
they are not counterexamples anymore.
A conjecture might even be at a higher level, for asserting
that a particular metaphor is appropriate or inappropriate.
Example 3. For example, someone who is familiar with the
‘gear means adjust setting’ metaphor in one program may be
comfortable with it in another program:
P1: “ An icon containing the ‘gear’ sign is a good one for
Settings, because it invokes the idea of a gear change on a
bicycle” (Initial Conjecture)
O1: “The ‘gear’ sign does not invoke the idea of a gear
change on a bicycle from my point of view.” (Counterex-
ample)
P2: “Ok, you’re right, it does not invoke the idea of a gear
change on a bicycle, but it is often used for Settings.”
(Monster-adjusting)
Example 4. Argumentation may also consider the role a
given abstract design plays within a given icon set.
P1: “Even without knowing what the first or third icon in
Figure 8I stands for, I can make a conjecture that it has
to do with a server or a user interface accessed via the
cloud. However, with the second icon, I’m not sure what
it means. It is composed of various signs that I don’t un-
derstand. It’s probably badly designed.” (Conjecture)
O1: “Did you notice that icons in Figure 8II and Figure 8III
are both defined as part of the same icon set? They
mean ‘Stateful component’ and ‘Processing component’
respectively. Therefore, the second icon is actually well
designed, because it uses signs appearing in other icons
of the same icon set.” (Counterexample)
2From http://cloudcomputingpatterns.org.
P2: “But the second icon contains a pipe sign that is not
used anywhere within the icon set, so I still don’t know
what the second icon means. If there were an icon with
a pipe sign with a clear meaning, then I could understand
the second icon better. ” (Strategic withdrawal)
The main characteristic of employing Lakatosian reasoning
is that it allows a dynamic and social development of the in-
tended meaning of blended icons. This cannot be achieved
by using only abstract argumentation frameworks, since
they assume that the object of discussion does not evolve.
Therefore, having an argumentation process of this kind has
several advantages: it promotes not only open-discussions
around the meaning of an icon, but also the construction of
a discourse about how an intended meaning is obtained.
This is a desirable characteristic in computational cre-
ativity when evaluating creative outcomes such as concept
blends. In this way, the evaluation evolves into a refinement
process of an initial created concept, giving much more flex-
ibility at the moment of deciding whether a blend is suitable.
Discussion
We have illustrated the use of argumentation to evaluate
completed blends. We alluded earlier to the role argumenta-
tion can play in the generation of blends, for instance by sug-
gesting different ways to generalise the input spaces. Indeed,
successive statements may serve to carry out the steps in the
blending process iteratively, relaxing or refining as needed.
These steps can be modelled using Lakatos’s moves. From a
conjectural candidate solution, to additional criteria that re-
veal this blend to be a ‘monster’ (i.e. which identify features
of the candidate solution that cannot be allowed in the final
solution for one reason or another), to adjustments that yield
a more complete description of the problem and point the
way toward a more satisfactory solution. An example of us-
ing argumentation for deciding which generalisations to use
for creating a new icon is the following:
A: “We can create a different blend icon starting from the
same icons of before.” (see Figure 6)
B: “We could use the HARDDISK sign from the first icon
and the DOCUMENT sign from the second icon.”
A: “But putting the DOCUMENT sign above the HARD-
DISK does not make sense from my point of view.”
B: “You’re right, let’s use the HARDDISK sign from the first
icon and the PEN sign from the second icon.“
A: “Sounds good, now we have a Write-HardDisk icon.”
From this discussion and the previous sections, we think
that it is feasible to bring the framework of argumentation in-
side the concept blending process. Moreover, this appears to
work in a symmetric direction: the steps in an argumentation
process can be carried out through blending. For instance,
concept blending could be seen as the process behind the
creation of rational arguments (Coulson and Pascual, 2006).
One area closely akin to the icon domain is the domain
of sentences in a natural or artificial language. These can be
evaluated for their coherence, succinctness, and fitness-to-
purpose from a semantic standpoint (including relationship
to other sentences), among other criteria; cf. (Abramsky and
Sadrzadeh, 2014) for a category-theoretic view.
Since people have different standards for evaluation, they
frequently disagree about what constitutes a satisfactory re-
sult, be it a final outcome or a design decision that is only a
step the way to developing an artefact. They may also dis-
agree at a more fundamental level about what can be consid-
ered a valid point of view or an appropriate manner of con-
ducting an argument. For example, “Godwin’s law” states
that an online discussion ends when someone compares one
of the discussants to Hitler and whoever made the compar-
ison automatically loses the debate (Godwin, 1994). Natu-
rally, the validity of this principle is itself debatable. Dur-
ing the course of argumentation, the goalposts may shift, as
new information is revealed about the domain under discus-
sion, and about the discussants themselves. The relationship
between argumentation and decision-making has been ex-
plored (Amgoud and Prade, 2009; Ouerdane, 2009), includ-
ing the case of updating models of preferences (Ouerdane et
al., 2014). This last mentioned project is quite similar to our
work on Lakatos’s games (Pease et al., 2014).
Conclusion and Future Work
Computational models of combinatorial creativity faces the
daunting issue of evaluating a large number of possible
novel combinations. Particularly, Fauconnier and Turner
(1998) propose a model that includes a collection of opti-
mality principles to guide the construction of a ‘well-formed
integration network’. Our computational model, based on
generalisations of input spaces and amalgams, makes this
combinatorial nature more explicit. The heuristic criteria
called ‘optimality principles’ are too underspecified to be
used as computational measures to evaluate and select pos-
sible blends. Moreover, alternative numeric measures may
be not enough to evaluate the quality or novelty of creative
artefacts. Our intuition is that in the context of new ideas,
proposals, or artworks, people use argumentation to under-
stand, criticise, modify and evaluate them, and that com-
putational argumentation is a useful tool for computational
creativity.
The domain of computer icons generated by blending,
where the evaluation of new icons is focused on their in-
tended meaning, shows that symbolic argumentation is a
process that is adequate to distinguish well-formed icons
from mix-and-match combinations, unambiguous and clear
icons from ambiguous or incomprehensible icons. This
domain supports our claim that numeric heuristic evalua-
tion measures are insufficient to recognise good blends, and
shows the usefulness of an argumentation-based process for
identifying good blends, detecting their critical problems,
and refining them in an evolving, open-ended process.
We have shown how Lakatosian reasoning can be used in
evaluating concept blending for icon design. Our approach
offers two main advantages. Firstly, the evaluation process
can improve the blend, since the dialogue about it refines
resulting blends. Secondly, the reasons behind a particular
evaluation are made explicit. This is crucial given recent
work on the importance of context in creativity judgments
(Charnley, Pease, and Colton, 2012; Colton, Pease, and
Charnley, 2011). Argumentation offers a framing story that
shows how and why a particular artefact was constructed,
which can be presented alongside the artefact itself.
We envision several future works. First, we intend to
specify an ontology for modelling the semiotic system pre-
sented and to build a library of icons. Having a domain
knowledge will allow us to generate arguments by induc-
tion, for instance, by analysing icons cases. Moreover, it will
also open the possibility to explore the use of value-based ar-
gumentation (Bench-Capon, Doutre, and Dunne, 2002) for
selecting the input icons to be used in the concept blend-
ing process. This latter point is important, since usually
the inputs of a blending process are assumed to be already
provided. Second, as far as the interpretation of icons is
concerned, we are thinking to take advantage of existing
approaches to natural language processing and understand-
ing, especially Construction Grammars (CxG). In CxG, the
grammatical construction is a pairing of form and content.
In our semiotic system, sign patterns seem equivalent to the
form, while interpretations would be akin to the content.
Finally, we plan to implement Lakatosian reasoning by
employing existing computational tools for argumentation
(Devereux and Reed, 2010; Wells and Reed, 2012). Our goal
is to provide a computational argumentation framework and
to integrate it into the framework for computational creativ-
ity we are developing in the COINVENT project.
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